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ZONING AGAINST THE PUBLIC WELFARE: JUDICIAL
LIMITATIONS ON MUNICIPAL PAROCHIALISM*
IN allocating the land resources of a municipality a zoning ordinance will
generally prohibit certain uses deemed objectionable or incompatible.1 On
occasion, uses so excluded-whether hospitals,2 churches,3 schools,4 homes
for children,5 or universities 6 -are of such demonstrable social utility that the
courts will not tolerate their exclusion. That the community's conception of
the public welfare might on occasion be too parochial was foreseen by the
Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 7 in a statement
which indicates that zoning contrary to a larger public interest would consti-
tute a basis for invalidating an ordinance:
*Wiltwyck School for Boys, Inc. v. Perry, 14 App. Div. 2d 198, 219 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1961).
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-90 (1926).
2. American University v. Prentiss, 113 F. Supp. 389 (D.D.C. 1953); San Diego
Tuberculosis Ass'n v. City of East San Diego, 186 Cal. 252, 200 Pac. 393 (1921) ; Ex parte
Whitwell, 98 Cal. 73, 32 Pac. 870 (1893) ; Jewish Consumptives' Relief Soc'y v. Town of
Woodbury, 230 App. Div. 228, 243 N.Y. Supp. 686 (1930), aff'd, 256 N.Y. 619, 177 N.E.
165 (1931).
3. Board of Zoning Appeals of Decatur v. Decatur, Indiana Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses,
233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954) ; Mooney v. Orchard Lake, 333 Mich. 389, 53 N.W.2d
308 (1952); Congregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo.
1959) ; State ex rel. Synod of Ohio v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1942) ;
State ex rel. Anshe Chesed Congregation v. Bruggemeier, 97 Ohio App. 67, 115 N.E.2d
65 (1953); Garden City Jewish Center v. Garden City, 2 Misc. 2d 1009, 155 N.Y.S.2d 523
(Sup. Ct. 1956), appeal dismissed, 157 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1956).
4. City of Chicago v. Sachs, 1 Il. 2d 342, 115 N.E.2d 762 (1953) ; Catholic Bishop of
Chicago v. Kingery, 371 Ill. 257, 20 N.E.2d 583 (1939) ; State v. Northwestern Prepara-
tory School, 228 Minn. 363, 37 N.W.2d 370 (1949); Lumpkin v. Township Committee,
134 N.J.L. 428, 48 A.2d 798 (1946); Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y. 2d
508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S2d 849 (1956); Brandeis School v. Lawrence, 18 Misc.
2d 550, 184 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1959).
5. University Heights v. Cleveland Jewish Orphans' Home, 20 F.2d 743 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 275 U.S. 569 (1927) ; Rogers v. Association For the Help of Retarded Children,
308 N.Y. 126, 123 N.E.2d 806 (1954) ; Franciscan Missionaries of Mary v. Herdman, 7
App. Div. 2d 993, aff'd without opinion, 7 N.Y. 2d 829 (1959); City of Rochester v.
Rochester Girls' Home, 194 N.Y. Supp. 236 (1922) ; Walker v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
380 Pa. 228, 110 A.2d 414 (1955).
6. American University v. Prentiss, 113 F. Supp. 389 (D.D.C. 1953); Western
Theological Seminary v. City of Evanston, 325 Ill. 511, 156 N.E. 778 (1927), aff'd, 333
Ill. 257, 162 N.E. 863 (1927); Long Island University v. Tappan, 202 Misc. 956, 113
N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. 1952), af'd, 305 N.Y. 893, 114 N.E.2d 432 (1953); Concordia
Collegiate Institute v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189, 93 N.E.2d 632 (1950) ; Hofstra College v.
Wilmerding, 24 Misc. 2d 248, 204 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1960), appeal dismissed, 12 App. Div. 2d
631, 210 N.Y.S2d 791 (1960).
7. 272U.S.365 (1926).
ZONING AND PUBLIC WELFARE
It is not meant by this . . . to exclude the possibility of cases where the
general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the munici-
pality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way.8
In a recent case, Wiltwyck School for Boys, Inc. v. Perry,9 the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court upheld the validity of an amended
zoning ordinance which excluded a use of uncontested social utility.10 Wiltwyck
maintains a home in up-state New York for roughly one-hundred neglected
and delinquent boys, aged eight to twelve, who are referred by New York
City welfare and correctional agencies." The home provides individual
therapy, extensive recreation and formal schooling at a public school operated
and staffed by the New York City Board of Education on Wiltwyck's
grounds.' 2 Because of its location 110 miles from New York City, Wiltwyck
has experienced great difficulty in recruiting residential staff and in utilizing
its part-time commuting personnel with maximum efficiency. 13 After the
enactment of municipal ordinances had thwarted two prior attempts to locate
closer to New York City,14 Wiltwyck purchased an estate in Yorktown, an
outlying suburb.15 It was refused a building permit, however, on the ground
that the proposed use was proscribed by an amendment to the town's zoning
ordinance. 16 This amendment-which was enacted immediately after Wiltwyck
had completed the purchase ' 7 -- prohibited the location of certain types of
charitable institutions within Yorktown.' 8 Wiltwyck sought to compel is-
8. Id. at 390. See also State ex rel. Synod of Ohio v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39
N.E.2d 515, 522 (1942):
The Village of Euclid case, while deciding that commercial and industrial structures
may, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, be excluded from residential
districts, decides nothing with regard to the exclusion of humanitarian, public and
semi-public uses like churches, schools and libraries.
9. 14 App. Div. 2d 198, 219 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1961).
10. Record, pp. 66-67, 257-58, Wiltwyck School for Boys, Inc. v. Perry, 14 App. Div.
2d 198, 219 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1961).
11. Record, pp.9-13.
12. Ibid.
13. Id. at 19-20.
14. Letter from Harry G. Liese to the Yalc Law Journal, December 13, 1961. (On file
in Yale Law Library.)
15. Record, p. 13.
16. Id. at 17-18.
17. Id. at 13,20-21.
18. Id. at 21. Building Ordinance of Yorktown. Section 220 of Art. II, defines "Charit-
able Institution" as follows:
A place, building or structure designed or used for any of the following purposes:
Home for the Aged.
Orphanage operated as an accessory use to a religious institution all of which are
operated on a non-profit basis and supported and financed solely by charitable funds;
an extension of welfare uses and research for the public health in existence in the
town prior to the date this amendment becomes effective, and operated on a non-
profit basis and supported and financed solely by public or charitable funds.
Eleemosynary Institutions.
Same as charitable institutions as defined herein.
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suance of the building permit on two grounds: first that it was not a treat-
ment center, but a school and therefore a permitted use under the ordinance
as amended; and second, that the ordinance if construed to bar institutions
such as Wiltwyck was invalid because it conflicted with an express policy of
the state providing for the support and welfare of delinquent and neglected
children.1 9 The Appellate Division rejected both contentions.20
The decision may be considered as representing a routine application of
the general principle that a court "does not sit as a super-zoning commis-
sion," 21 and that given a reasonable basis for a contested provision, a court,
out of deference to the legislature, will uphold its validity.22 This position is
grounded in considerations of propriety and competency. 23
Propriety: Advocates of this approach argue that absent a clear legislative
mandate, a court should not impose its preference for a particular land use on
a municipality. Adjustments between conflicting demands for the use of
land are matters for political action, not judicial fiat. This is particularly true
when, as in the case of Wiltwyck, a use which services the metropolitan area,
wishes to locate in the suburbs. Legislatures, not courts, are the proper area for
the struggle between the suburb and the metropolitan areas. 24
Competency: It is further contended that a court should not substitute its
judgment for that of the professional planning staff because it lacks the in-
19. These were the principal arguments dealt with in the decisions of the Appellate
Division, 14 App. Div. 2d 198, 219 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1961). Wiltwyck also contended that the
ordinance as amended deprived it of the equal protection of the law in that there was no
reasonable basis for the classification created by the Yorktown amendment. In permitting
only homes for the aged and orphanages operated as an accessory use to religious institutions,
the amendment excluded such uses as non-denominational orphanages, homes for cardiac
children, for victims of cerebral palsy, etc. The distinction is as reasonable and achieves the
same effect as if it had read "All charities beginning with ', are hence barred from York-
town." See Decision by Mr. Justice Coyle, New York Law Journal, April 15, 1960, re-
printed in Record, pp. 328-34.
20. Wiltwyck School for Boys, Inc. v. Perry, 14 App. Div. 2d 198, 219 N.Y.S.2d 161
(1961).
21. Robinson v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich. 425,430, 86 N.W.2d 166, 169 (1957).
22. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926).
23. Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 515,
530-33 (1957) ; Robinson v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich. 425, 430, 86 N.W.2d 166,
169 (1957).
24. In the phases of urban life and activity in which I have worked most during the
last twenty years-urban planning, housing and redevelopment-I find it hard to
escape the conclusion that the trend is on the whole against or away from mutual
understanding, respect and trust across group and class lines.... [Z]oning ordinances
have had a major influence in [this] direction. This influence seems to increase as the
amendment and redrafting of ordinances add more and more finely drawn use dis-
tricts. The common sense observation that slaughter houses and stamping mills should
not be located next to dwellings or hospitals has been gradually extended to justify and
support an increasing amount of segregation among various kinds of residential devel-
opment.
Woodbury, The Background and Prospects of Urban Redevelopment in the United States,
in THE FUTURE OF CITIES AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 634-35 (Woodbury ed. 1953).
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formation and expertise to evaluate the increasingly complex considerations
which underlie each zoning provision. The issue of competency is particularly
critical when a court is asked to determine whether alternate suitable sites
exist. This determination may be necessary where it is alleged that the ex-
clusion of a particular use from one locality subverts a state policy. If the
prohibited use could function as effectively on an alternate and available site,
the decision of one community to exclude the use would not actually thwart
state policy. And to determine whether alternate sites exist, a court would have
to construct a regional picture of available sites from a complex of land use
maps and real estate data. Even if the courts were equal to this task, they
would be unable to predict the response of other localities should the excluded
use seek to locate within their bounds. 25
These considerations are urged in support of non-judicial resolution of the
conflicts generated between state and locality, city and suburb regarding the
location of institutions like Wiltwyck.26 Three distinct types of such solutions
would enable authorities to override parochial interests in allocating land for
uses which service the larger region. First, local governmental bodies could
create an area of political control coextensive with the needs of a functionally
defined geographic area.27 Second, the state legislature could create a planning
board with power to allocate resources on a state-wide basis in conformity
with a comprehensive master plan.28 Third, the plight of specific institutions,
such as hospitals, sanitariums, schools and private utilities, can be relieved by
special legislation authorizing the use of eminent domain on their behalf.2 9
A variant on the delegation of eminent domain utilized by New York State on
behalf of private tuberculosis sanitariums appears particularly applicable to the
25. In Wiltwycek's case, such a prediction would have been of particular importance in
determining the existence of alternate available sites. Yorktown was the third municipality
to respond to Wiltwyck's location efforts with an exclusionary amendment to the zoning
law. Presumably further such responses might have occurred wherever Wiltwyck attempted
to buy an estate. Letter from Harry G. Liese to the Yale LaA Journal, December 13, 1961.
(On file in the Yale Law Library.)
26. Haar, vupra note 23, at 530-37.
27. The means tried and proposed include: annexation of unincorporated territory,
consolidations of two or more municipalities, city-county consolidation, intergovernmental
agreements, special districts and authorities. See generally WEBSTER, URBAN PLANNING
AND MUNICIPAL PUBLIC POLICY 55-76 (1958) ; McDOUGAL & HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTN,
LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 751-66, 980-81 (1948). See generally A
Symposium on Metropolitan Regionalism: Developing Governmental Concepts, 105 U. PA.
L. REV. 439-616 (1957).
28. See Haar, supra note 23, at 531-35.
29. Several approaches are possible: (1) granting the appropriate state agency the
power to condemn land for an institution. See Brent v. Hoch, 25 Misc. 2d 1062, 205 N.Y.S.2d
66 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 13 App. Div. 2d 505, 211 N.Y.S2d 853 (1961), construing N.Y.
MENTAL HYGIENE AcT § 46(1); or (2) granting the power of eminent domain to the
private party subject to review of the reasonableness of its exercise by the appropriate ad-
ministrative agency. See In re Hackensack Water Co., 41 N.J. Super. 408 (App. Div. 1956),
construing N.J. REV. STAT. § 40:55-50 (1928).
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Wiltwyck situation.30 The state could bestow on Wiltwvyck and similar institu-
tions a statutory grant of immunity exempting them from the application of
local zoning ordinances. A use receiving such immunity would not possess the
power to condemn, but once having found a willing seller, it could purchase
and utilize the land subject only to review by appropriate state officials. This
would not run afoul of the "public use" standard for eminent domain.31 The
state, in effect, is merely withdrawing part of the police power it delegated to
municipalities when it authorized them to pass zoning ordinances.
Whether or not it is believed that the foregoing legislative solutions would
constitute the most desirable way of adjusting and preventing disputes such as
that posed in the Wiltwyck case, such solutions may be long in coming.32
Suburban communities are especially loth to enter any scheme of cooperation
which entails their shouldering a larger share of the costs of urban services,
either directly, through taxes, or indirectly, through being compelled to ac-
commodate additional tax-free institutions.33 Similarly, suburban dwellers are
reluctant to subject themselves to the decisions of a metropolitan or state
planning board which might subordinate their interests to the often con-
flicting interests of the urban or rural areas. 34 Finally, unless institutions
like Wiltwyck gain considerably more political influence, it is highly unlikely
that they will overcome the traditional reluctance of state legislatures to enact
legislation granting the power of eminent domain or zoning immunity to
private interests.3
In the absence of a legislative resolution, institutions such as Wiltwyck
have turned to the courts for remedial action. And courts have frequently
recognized the necessity of protecting institutions which serve a larger public
interest from the operation of local zoning ordinances.36 In so doing, they
customarily utilize three techniques, any of which would have enabled the
30. See Jewish Consumptives' Relief Soc'y v. Town of Woodbury, 230 App. Div. 228,
243 N.Y. Supp. 686 (1930), aff'd, 256 N.Y. 619, 17 N.E. 165 (1931), construing N.Y. PUBLIC
HEALTH LAW §§ 2269-70.
31. Private universities, lodges, Chatauqua and churches have consistently been denied
the right to employ the power of eminent domain because this power can only be exercised
for a "public purpose" and courts have frequently construed this phrase to mean "use by the
public." 2 NIcHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 7.2(1), 7.517 (3d ed. 1950).
32. See generally Moak, Some Practical Obstacles in Modifying Govcrnmental
Structure to Meet Metropolitan Problems, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 603 (1957).
33. Id. at 611-12.
34. THE FUTURE OF CITIES AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 501 n.39 (Woodbury ed. 1953).
35. See note 31 supra.
36. See cases cited notes 2-6 supra. The dilemma of the courts has been put thus in
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. City of Fulton, 8 App. Div. 2d 523, 529, 188 N.Y.S.2d
717, 723-24 (1959) :
The situation created by the failure of the local legislative body to provide for
necessary public utility structures is, at best, an unsatisfactory one. The questions
involved in the selection of a site ought to be determined by a legislative or administra-
tive body rather than by the courts . . . . Where no legislative provisions of this
character exist, the task must be undertaken by the courts and the courts must do
[Vol. 71:720
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Appellate Division to decide in favor of Wiltwyck. First, a court may feel
impelled by reason of public policy to expand by construction one of the
categories of permitted uses to include an apparently excluded party.3 7
Secondly, it may extend the governmental immunity possessed by a public
institution to private institutions carrying out similar functions on grounds
that no reasonable basis for differential treatment can be found.38 And third,
the best they can in determining whether the use of the particular proposed site is
reasonably necessary, in the light of all the factors bearing upon that question.
Charles M. Haar describes the situation accurately when he says that courts "have been
plunged into the vacuum of power" resulting from the lack of any comprehensively oriented
state or municipal planning agency whose jurisdiction corresponded to the dimensions of a
functionally interdependent area. Haar, supra note 23, at 536. And while he argues proper-
ly that courts "do not seem the most desirable focus for resolving inter-community con-
flicts or promoting regional land development" he concedes that "absent some other agency
for the resolution of this type of dispute" the influence of the courts is likely to grow.
Haar, mspra note 23, at 527. "If ... other governmental agencies default, certainty as well
as the need to come to a final decision may be as important as the merits of the particular
decision." Haar, supra note 23, at 531.
37. The courts do not explicitly acknowledge that policy reasons lie behind their
decision that the excluded institution should be included within the category of permitted
uses as judicially defined. Nonetheless, the mention of policy considerations which are almost
unfailingly present in these cases leads one to suspect a causal connection. The following
statement is representative of the intermingling of policy considerations in the process of
defining the category of permitted uses:
As to plaintiffs' claim that the use to which the prior owner put the property had
been a convalescent home and not a school, we think the argument disregards both
the statutory requirement last cited above, and the strong public policy of the state
which favors the education of all children, however handicapped.
Rogers v. Association for the Help of Retarded Children, 308 N.Y. 126, 132, 123 N.E.2d 802,
806 (1954). See also Langbein v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 135 Conn. 575, 67 A.2d 5 (1949) ;
Livingston v. Davis, 243 Iowa 21, 50 N.W.2d 592 (1951); Five Towns YM and YWHA,
Inc. v. Plaut, 14 Misc. 2d 61, 178 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd without opilion, 7
App. Div. 2d 646, 181 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1958) ; Merrick Community Nursery School v. Young,
11 Misc. 2d 576, 171 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. 1958) ; People v. Collins, 191 Misc. 553, 83
N.Y.S2d 124 (1948) ; City of Rochester v. Rochester Girls' Home, 194 N.Y. Supp. 236
(Sup. Ct. 1922) ; United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n v. Zoninz Bd. of Adjustment, 382 Pa. 67,
114 A.2d 331 (1955); Walker v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 380 Pa. 228, 110 A.2d 414
(1955).
38. This technique is most commonly used in cases which involve the exclusion of private
schools. The importance of private elementary and secondary schools in this country makes
differential treatment contrary to public policy and this explains the overwhelming judicial
opposition to excluding private schools. See Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.
2d 508, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956) and cases collected in Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d
653 (1954). Although most courts say that there is no reasonable basis for differential
treatment, noting that private and public schools work the same detriment on the surround-
ing community, it is clear that policy considerations blind them to one distinction-namely,
the nature of the service conferred on the public-which has been noted in two cases; State
ex rel. Wisconsin Lutheran High School Conference v. Sinar, 267 Wis. 91, 65 N.W.2d 43
(1954); Great Neck Community School v. Dick, 140 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd
on other grounds, 3 App. Div. 2d 664, 158 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1957). This "use by the public"
distinction has been utilized by the courts to deny the grant of eminent domain to a private
college. Connecticut College for Women v. Calvert, 87 Conn. 421, 88 AtI. 633 (1913).
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it may invalidate an ordinance because a certain use is so essential to the
public welfare that an ordinance which excludes it can bear no reasonable re-
lation to the public welfare.39 The first two techniques have been used by
courts in a variety of familiar statutory contexts and present few novel issues.
The third technique-which rests explicitly on considerations of state public
policy-represents, perhaps, the most accurate description of why courts
respond to the claims of an excluded use. As such, it is significant both in
itself and also as a rationale for the application of the other two techniques.
For purposes of analysis it will be treated as if it were the single basis for a
court's decision.
The imprecision of a standard explicitly based on considerations of "public
welfare" raises serious practical problems. If the standard to be applied is
simply whether or not the excluded use is "clearly in furtherance of the public
welfare," few uses could be excluded from even the most "exclusive" residen-
tial zones. 40 Graveyards, garbage disposal units and heavy industry, for ex-
ample, are indispensable to the health and welfare of a community. But it
hardly follows that all such uses should be permitted in residential suburbs.41
Nor is the modification suggested by Judge Klienfeld-that the use "is under
the direct supervision, care and concern of the State itself"42-sufficient to
distinguish between uses which should or should not secure judicial protec-
tion. Virtually every industry, commercial enterprise, institution or organi-
zation can point to some federal or state policy which it advances subject to
varying degrees of government control and assisted by various forms of
federal or state subsidy.43
Since the "public welfare" standard by itself provides no conceptually
adequate criteria for limiting its application, any attempt to give meaning to
39. The statement made in Catholic Bishop v. Kingery, 371 Ill. 257, 259-60, 20 N.E.2d
583, 584 (1939) is representative of the courts' manner of stating the issues of public policy:
As a matter of fact such a school, conducted in accordance with the educational
requirements established by State educational authorities, is promotive of the general
welfare.
See cases cited notes 2-6 supra. See also BAss=r, ZONING 70-79, 196, 198-200 (1940) ; In re
O'I-ara's Appeal, 389 Pa. 35, 131 A.2d 587 (1957). For reasons that will be seen, this third
technique is always used in conjunction with the contention that the zoning provision in
question violates the due process or equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Interference
with the general rights of property owners can only be sustained if it bears "a substantial
relation to the ...general welfare." Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188
(1928). A restriction that is contrary to public policy will, by definition, bear no such sub-
stantial relationship and will therefore be invalid as arbitrary, confiscatory, or discrimina-
tory.
40. Cf. 2 NICHOLS, EmINENT DomAIN § 72(3) (3d ed. 1950).
41. Indeed, courts have frequently tolerated their total exclusion. Duffcon Concrete
Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949) ; West Bloomfield Town-
ship v. Chapman, 351 Mich. 606, 88 N.W.2d 377 (1958) ; and tee note 1 mipra.
42. 219 N.Y.S.2d at 187 quoting Matter of Concordia Collegiate Institute v. Miller,
301 N.Y. 189, 195-96, 93 N.E.2d 632, 636 (1950) (dicta).
43. Cf. EISENSTmN, THE ImEoLOGIEs o' TAXATIOx 143-46 (1961).
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the courts' articulation of this standard must begin with the observation
that some notion of preferred institutions apparently underlies those zoning
decisions immunizing private uses.44 These preferred uses may be described
roughly as non-profit institutions devoted to medical, eleemosynary, religious
or educational purposes. The equities are not always on the side of these
preferred uses 4r and such uses certainly do not always prevail in court. 0
Thus, it becomes necessary to inquire what considerations have moved the
courts to strike down zoning ordinances on grounds of public policy. 47
44. In our economy, churches, schools, play grounds, and other community institutions
occupy a very different status in the regulating aspect from purely business enter-
prises where people gather in companies. They have always been thought to be im-
portant assets to our cultural, social and moral needs ....
State of Florida ex rel. Tampa Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Tampa, 48 So. 2d
78, 79 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1950). See also Matter of Concordia Collegiate Institute v. Miller, 301
N.Y. 189, 195-96, 93 N.E.2d 632, 635 (1950) :
In the case now before us, we are not dealing with billboards or garages or other
offensive uses in connection with which consent provisions may be proper, but with an
educational use which is clearly in furtherance of the health, safety, morals and general
welfare of the community, and is under the direct supervision, care and concern of
the State itself. Zoning ordinances must find their justification in the police power
exercised in the interest of the public.
The notion of preferred institutions may be translatable into a problem of demonstrating
sufficient governmental concern: Is there a provision in the state or federal constitution
which recognizes the function of the institution as being of special value to the state? An-
alytically, this restatement begs the question. Is the use preferred because it can point to a
relevant constitutional provision; or is there a relevant constitutional provision because the
use is preferred. If the latter, then we must ask why is it preferred. To answer this, it is
necessary to state for what purposes the use is preferred and then it may be possible to
suggest functional reasons for the preference. In the context of this Note, preference refers
to the right of the institution to locate in a residential district, notwithstanding an exclusion-
ary zoning ordinance. Preference for this purpose may be explained in terms of the general
and specific environmental needs of the institution. See text accompanying notes 48-70 infra.
45. Some types of institutions, for example, no matter how salutory their purpose, work
unreasonable hardships on a residential community (i.e., a trade school or maximum
security prison). Cf. Kanasy v. Nugent, 206 Misc. 826, 135 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1954), aff'd, 286
App. Div. 1038, 145 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1955), appeal denied, 1 App. Div. 2d 681, 148 N.Y.S.2d
455 (1955). In addition, a municipality may need to maintain its dwindling supply of
desirable residential land, not merely for tax purposes, but to prevent the continued exodus
of that indigenous leadership upon which effective and far-sighted local government de-
pends. See text at note 62 infra.
46. E.g., City of Chico v. First Ave. Baptist Church of Chico, 108 Cal. App. 2d 297,
238 P.2d 587 (1951) ; Sexton v. Bates, 17 N.J. Super. 246, 85 A.2d 833 (1951) ; In the
Matter of Jewish Mental Health Soc'y v. Village of Hastings, 268 N.Y. 458, 198 N.E. 30
(1935), modified, 269 N.Y. 562 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 696 (1935), affirming
243 App. Div. 707, 277 N.Y. Supp. 989 (1935) ; Wiltwyck School for Boys, Inc. v. Perry,
14 App. Div. 2d 198, 219 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1961) ; Application of Devereux Foundation, Inc.,
351 Pa. 478, 41 A.2d 744, appeal dismiissed, 326 U.S. 686 (1945).
47. It is not meant to imply that by enumerating certain considerations one can reconcile
all existing case law. Irreconcilable inconsistencies are clearly present in some of these cases.
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It is submitted that the following three considerations operate as successive
limitations on the extension of immunity to uses which challenge an ordinance
on grounds of public policy: 1) general environmental requirements of the
use; 2) the specific need to locate in a particular community; and 3) the
detriment to the community in which it proposes to locate. These considera-
tions, while not articulated by the courts as outcome determinative factors, do
receive judicial recognition when courts attempt to sum up the most com-
pelling aspects of the particular factual situation before them. To this extent,
the court's preferences for certain types of institutions are circumscribed by
factors which to a considerable degree are susceptible of empirical analysis.
General Environmental Requirements
A party challenging a zoning ordinance has the initial burden of demon-
strating that location in the type of zone from which it has been excluded is
essential rather than merely advantageous to the fulfillment of its service func-
tion. Unless the party can demonstrate this need, it has not been sufficiently in-
jured to justify relief. Courts have tended to assume the essential need of
hospitals, schools and churches to locate in otherwise restricted residential
neighborhoods.4 8 The inappropriateness of available locations in less restricted
commercial or industrial zones has been noted by the courts. 49 In State ex rel.
Synod of Ohio v. Joseph,50 for example, the court elaborated the functional
need of the excluded church:
Fully to accomplish its great religious and social function, the church
should be integrated into the home life of the community which it serves.
Churches in fitting surroundings are an inspiration to their members
and to the general public. If located in the residential district-space,
perspective, greenswards and trees aid in setting off the beauty of the
building and thereby increasing its inspiration. To require that churches
be banished to the business district, crowded alongside filling stations
However, it is hoped that an inductive approach to cases involving "preferred institutions"
will at once describe the vast majority of cases and will provide an analytical framewor.
within which future cases can be handled in a consistent manner. To the extent that it is
hoped that these considerations will be more clearly articulated and consciously applied in
the future, the remaining discussion contains an avowedly normative element.
48. See BAssarr, ZONING 70-73, 196-200 (1940) for the classic discussion of such
institutions' functional needs. Courts often cite to Bassett rather than examining the particu-
lar facts of the case. E.g., Langbein v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 135 Conn. 575, 67 A.2d 5
(1949).
49. E.g., Livingston v. Davis, 243 Iowa 21, 29, 50 N.W.2d 592, 597 (1951) where the
court noted:
It does not seem reasonable this zoning ordinance was intended to restrict such
a use as defendants make of their property to an Industrial District. Certainly that
would not be a suitable place for it.
And see O'Brien v. City of Chicago, 347 Ill. App. 45, 51, 105 N.E.2d 917, 920 (1952) where
the court implied that a zoning ordinance could not force churches into sparsely inhabited
areas.
50. 139 Ohio St. 229,39 N.E.2d 515 (1942).
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and grocery stores, is clearly not to be justified on the score of promot-
ing the general welfare. 5 '
Application of this first consideration requires a decision as to how essential
these environmental needs are. Often, there is no more ideal a location for
a funeral parlor, drugstore, or delicatessen than a quiet, exclusive residential
neighborhood. And conceivably a manufacturing concern could procure testi-
mony from a battery of industrial psychologists that such an environment
would inspire the research staff and increase productivity enormously.
Obviously, the courts in distinguishing between an advantageous location and
an essential one are considering the degree of impairment of the service of-
fered by the use which will result if the use is excluded from this type of
location."
The Specific Need To Locate in a Particular Community
To invalidate a zoning ordinance, an institution must do more than
demonstrate that it needs to locate in a certain type of neighborhood; it must
show specific need to locate in the particular community from which it has
been excluded. In analyzing this second criterion, two groups of cases must be
distinguished. The first and most common group involves uses which service
the area in which they wish to locate and from which they have been excluded.
Churches and private elementary or secondary schools are obvious examples of
such uses. The second group involves uses which do not service the community
in which they wish to locate. It is more difficult for such a use to establish
the need to locate in any given community even though it is clear that be-
cause of its "general environmental needs" a suitable location cannot be found
in the area which it services 5 3
A. Institutions serving the area from which excluded. In cases involving
the exclusion of churches and privately operated elementary and secondary
51. 39 N.E.2d at 524.
52. See State ex rel. Lake Drive Baptist Church v. Village of Bayside Bd. of Trustees,
12 Wis. 2d 585, 108 N.W.2d 288, 296 (1961) where the court said:
An ordinance which excludes a church from a particular district must pass two
tests :
(1) Can it reasonably be said that use for a church would have such an effect
on the area that exclusion of such use will promote the general welfare, and
(2) Does the exclusion impose a burden upon freedom of worship which is not
commensurate with the promotion of general welfare secured?
See also Young Israel Organization v. Dworkin, 105 Ohio App. 89, 133 N.E.2d 174 (1956)
where the court noted that because of religious restrictions on Sabbath activity, a place of
worship for orthodox Jews must be within walking distance of their homes.
53. For instance, if a sanitarium, school or treatment center accepts only those persons
who reside in a metropolitan area, barring topographical peculiarities, it may with equal
convenience perform its services for that city while located in any of the suburbs within
reasonable commuting distance from the city. Exclusion of the institution from one suburb
works no hardships on the persons to be aided by the institution, if it can locate in another
suburb as close to the area which it services.
1962]
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schools, courts are particularly sensitive to the claim that the rights of parties
whom the institution serves have been infringed by the exclusionary zoning
ordinance. Churches have been granted standing to assert the first amend-
ment rights of parishioners 54 and private schools have likewise been permit-
ted to invoke the right of parents to send their children to the accredited school
of their choice.5 5 Moreover, the courts do not inquire into how many persons'
rights are impaired or how severe the impairment is even when most of the
persons served live in another community.5 6 Two explanations of why courts
refuse to make this inquiry are possible. First; the future residential distribu-
tion of those whom the institution serves may be entirely different from that
which presently exists.57 A church or school, anticipating a suburban migra-
tion, may wish to locate in advance of this shift while land is still available
and cheap. A court promulgated rule that an institution can locate only where
a certain percentage of its present clientele resides would straight-jacket the
institution. Second, even if it be conceded that only a small number of resi-
dents presently are or in the future will be served, the courts will not consider
this to be a valid basis for barring the use. They reason that insofar as many
local residents attend, for example, churches or schools in neighboring com-
munities, reciprocity demands that the entry of a use should not be prevented
solely on the ground that it predominantly serves non-residents.5 8
B. Institutions which do not service the community in which they seek to
locate. Wiltwyck provides an excellent example of such a use. In defending
the propriety of its ordinance, Yorktown contended that the correct criterion
to be applied to such uses was
whether or not locations that are suitable ... are available under the ag-
gregate of existing zoning regulations .... 59
Indeed, it is sensible to require a party having a choice of sites in two com-
munities, one of which proscribes such uses, the other of which permits them,
54. Any restriction upon the opportunity to build a house of worship is at least a
potential burden upon the freedom of those who would like to worship there. Whether
the burden is slight or substantial will depend upon circumstances. In a community
where adequate and accessible building sites are available in all districts, it might be a
negligible burden to exclude churches from some of them. There must be many circum-
stances under which a religious group could demonstrate that an exclusion from a
particular area would be a substantial burden.
State ex rel. Lake Drive Baptist Church v. Village of Bayside Bd. of Trustees, 12 Wis. 2d
585, 108 N.W.2d 288,296 (1961). See also cases cited note 2 supra.
55. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924). See also cases cited noted 4 supra.
56. E.g., Hofstra College v. Wilmerding, 24 Misc. 2d 248, 204 N.Y.S.2d 476, appeal
dismissed, 12 App. Div. 2d 631, 210 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1960) ; Andrews v. Ocean Township, 30
N.J. 245 (1959) ; State ex rel. Anshe Chesed Congregation v. Bruggemeier, 97 Ohio App.
67, 115 N.E.2d 65 (1953).
57. Hofstra College v. Wilmerding supra note 56.
58. State ex rel. Anshe Chesed Congregation v. Bruggemeier, 97 Ohio App. 67, 115
N.E.2d 65 (1953).
59. Record, p. 263.
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to select a site in the latter community.°0 The critical question, however, not
ruled on by the court, involves the time at which the rule of "alternate unre-
stricted sites" should be applied: the date of purchase or the date of trial.0 '
It would seem both sensible and necessary to utilize the rule as being implicitly
operative at the time of purchase, not at the time of trial. If the date of pur-
chase is the applicable time, Wiltwyck made a reasonable choice when it
declined to purchase land in two other communities which had already passed
exclusionary zoning ordinances 02 and completed the transaction in Yorktown
where it was a permitted use when title passed. 3 If the date of trial were the
applicable time, then Wiltwyck, in making a purchase, would have to find a
site which was not restricted and would not become so. And the court, in
passing on the validity of a zoning ordinance enacted after the purchase, would
have to decide whether there were alternate sites which were presently unre-
stricted and which would remain so. 64 A rule which necessitates predicting the
responses of each of many communities to Wiltwyckts efforts to purchase
places an impossible burden both on the purchaser and on the court. It seems
much more sensible to make the time of title passage the cut off point deter-
mining whether there were alternate available unrestricted sites.65 Even if the
date of purchase is deemed the proper time to apply the above rule, a
municipality may still contend that it has the power to frustrate, by its zoning
60. This principle has been applied by the courts in public utilities cases in determining
whether there was reasonable necessity in the choice of site. See In re Hackensack Water
Co., 41 N.J. Super. 408, 426 (App. Div. 1956) (dictum).
61. This issue was raised by appellant's attorney in objecting to the testimony of an
expert witness on the subject of alternate available sites:
Mr. Liese: But then the witness would have to say that he knows that if any, a
particular community where if we purchase land and let the public know that we are
coming in with Wiltwyck, they would welcome us with open arms and wouldn't amend
their zoning ordinance the way they did in this case.
The Court: I do believe it's apparent that we're dealing with an exact subject and
exact science. Human beings will react the same no matter where you go. You
never can tell how they're going to react. They will not say to you in East Burlap
"We would love to have you here" and put you there but on the other hand, they
might say, "We are going to change this ordinance."
Record, p. 271.
62. Letter from Harry G. Liese to Yale Law Journal, December 13, 1961. (On file in
Yale Law Library.)
63. See text accompanying notes 16, 17 supra.
64. See note 61 supra.
65. An additional reason may be given for considering the "alternate site" rule as
applicable at time of title passage and not at a subsequent date. A charitable institution will,
with relative ease, be able to secure a conditional sales agreement making execution of the
sales contract dependent on the use's still being a permitted one under the zoning ordinance
as of the time of title passage. It is extremely unlikely, however, that a seller will agree
to stand as guarantor against all future changes in the zoning law unless the buyer possesses
extraordinary economic leverage on the seller.
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ordinance, the purpose for which the land was bought so long as it does not
deprive the owner of a reasonable financial return on his land.66 The courts
reply to this contention by viewing a zoning ordinance which totally frustrates
the purpose for which the land was purchased as being confiscatory in the
case of non-profit institutions 17 though not in the case of the normal property
owner. Apparently, the courts are willing to impute a profit motive to nearly
all property owners, whether or not such a motive in fact exists. In the case
of non-profit institutions, however, the courts appear unwilling to impute a
profit motive 68 and will not inquire whether the zoning ordinance in any way
lowers the market value of their land.6 9 Since the land was bought to fulfill a
66. Frustration of purposes was alleged by the appellant in the Euclid case, supra note
1, and is likely to transpire as a result of nearly any zoning ordinance.
67. See, e.g., the court's statement in Long Island University v. Tappan, 202 Misc.
956, 960, 113 N.Y.S.2d 795, 799 (1952) :
Insofar as the zoning ordinance seeks to prohibit entirely the use of plaintiff's lands in
the village for the purposes for which it is chartered, the zoning ordinance is void
and ineffectual, as beyond the power of the village board to enact and as bearing no
reasonable relation to the promotion of the health, safety, morals or general welfare of
the community. (Emphasis added).
See also cases cited note 6 wipra. Since the purpose of holding land in the case of a non-
profit institution is generally not to sell it and realize a profit or reasonable financial return,
an ordinance which prevents use of the land for charitable, service purposes is more nearly
confiscatory in its effect. For this reason an ordinance which deprives a charitable non-
profit organization of the opportunity to use its land to render services will be invalid-while
an ordinance which bars institutions carrying on the same services but for gain will be
sustained as a valid exercise of the police power. City of Champaign v. Roseman, 15 Ill. 2d
363, 155 N.E.2d 34 (1958) ; York Harbor Village Corp. v. Libby, 126 Me. 537, 140 Atl. 382
(1928) ; McCarter v. Beckwith, 247 App. Div. 289, 285 N.Y. Supp. 151 (1936) ; Dunkirk
Aerie v. City of Dunkirk, 274 App. Div. 685, 87 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1949) ; Lawrence v. Nissen,
173 N.C. 359,91 S.E. 1036 (1917).
68. If, however, the land, though owned by a non-profit institution, was to be used for a
profit-making venture that would supply income to the non-profit institution, frustration of
purpose would not be sufficient. Cf. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 502, 511-15 which deny
tax-exempt status to "feeder organizations" (organizations operated primarily to carry on a
trade or business for profits for the benefit of a tax exempt organization). Even without
these code provisions, the courts have denied tax exempt status to such businesses. Ralph H.
Eaton Foundation v. Comm'r, 219 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1955) ; contra, C. F. Mueller Co. v.
Comm'r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951).
69. See Concordia Collegiate Institute v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189, 196-97, 93 N.E2d 632,
636 (1950) where the court rejected the contention that
petitioner could obtain relief upon a proper showing of hardship .... Petitioner's
property is in a residence zone, and it frankly concedes-what is in fact eident-that
it cannot demonstrate that its land will not yield a reasonable return if used only for
the purpose allowed in that zone, naamely, for residences. Therefore, it asserts, it
could not obtain a variance on the ground of hardship under our decisions, . . . and
even if the board of appeals should grant its application, the variance would be a
nullity, and by no means immune from attack by owners of adjoining property.
In short, petitioner urges that it should not be compelled to seek as a matter of
grace and special privilege what at best is an extremely unlikely result, in the face of
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service function, a zoning ordinance preventing such use has been deemed
confiscatory.70
Detriment To The Community
It may be conceded that many institutional uses are not ideal neighbors,
depress surrounding property values, and deprive the municipality of need-
ed ta- revenues. 71 In considering the resulting detriment to the community,
courts appear to distinguish between unusual detriment-those undesirable
effects which would result from the interaction of the use with unique en-
vironmental conditions in the neighborhood where it proposes to locate-and
customary detriment-those undesirable effects which invariably attend the
presence of churches, hospitals, schools and the like.72 Courts disregard the
customary detriment which attends the presence of such institutions in the
community on the grounds that this detriment is merely an inevitable social
cost of the highly valued and indispensable services which they render. 73 So
an invalid statute that stands in the way of relief as a matter of right .... (Emphasis
added.)
For this same reason, the variance, when based solely on hardship, is not a remedy available
to non-profit institutions who do not allege that they have been deprived of the possibility of
obtaining a reasonable financial return on their land. Variances may be granted only where
the property, not the owner, is subjected to hardship; the fact that some unique circumstance
personal to the owner makes the property unusable by him as restricted does not authorize a
variance. Gold v. Zoning Ed. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 401, 143 A.2d 59 (1958) ; Carney v.
City of Baltimore, 201 Md. 130, 93 A.2d 74 (1952) ; In re Kline, 395 Pa. 122, 148 A.2d 915
(1959). See generally Reps, Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW
& CONTEmP. PROB. 280,282-89 (1955).
70. See note 67 supra.
71. These and other detrimental effects were all presented in Diocese of Rochester v.
Planning Bd., 1 N.Y. 2d 508, 136 N.E2d 827, 154 N.Y.S2.d 849 (1956) and collectively re-
jected by the court as insufficient grounds for barring a religious use "clearly in furtherance
of ... the general welfare." See also cases cited in notes 3, 4 supra.
72. In Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Ed., 1 N.Y. 2d at 526, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 863, the
New York Court of Appeals said:
That is not to say that appropriate restrictions may never be imposed with respect to
a church and school and accessory uses, nor is it to say that under no circumstances
may they ever be excluded from designated areas.
Simultaneously the Court rejected allegations of traffic hazards, loss of tax revenues, decline
in property values and decreased enjoyment of neighboring property as sufficient reasons for
excluding a church. See also Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Baker, 140 Ore. 600, 610, 15 P.2d
391,394 (1932) :
The reasons given for this decrease in value will apply with equal force to any other
residential district, either of the first or second class.
73. We do not believe it is a proper function of government to interfere in the name of
the public to exclude churches from residential districts for the purpose of securing to
adjacent landowners the benefits of exclusive residential restrictions.
State cx rtl. Synod of Ohio v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515, 524 (1942). None-
theless it is still possible to inquire why the costs of charitable enterprises such as churches,
schools, etc., should not be borne by those institutions rather than shifted to the unfortunate
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long as some neighborhood or community must bear this detriment, no single
community is entitled to rid itself of the burden by simply shifting it to an-
other. However, if a showing of unusual detriment is made by the community,
the exclusionary provision may be sustained. The following fact situations
might warrant a finding of unusual detriment. Example 1: A private hospital
purchases property in an area of special historic interest with narrow, pic-
turesque streets. The town argues that the streets cannot accommodate the
projected increase in traffic which the new use will generate. Example 2:
Wiltwyck tries to locate in a town where another institution charged with
the care and reformation of delinquent boys (or girls) already exists. The
town argues that the concentration of these two groups in a confined area
might result in undesirable interaction. 74 Example 3: A private school pur-
chases an estate in an exclusive residential neighborhood where several other
institutional uses have previously located. The town argues that its dearth of
desirable residential land is critical and that the presence of one additional
institutional use will change the residential character of the neighborhood.
This might be conceptualized as an instance in which the cumulative effect
of the customary detriment caused by individual institutions has created a
situation in which unique detriment will accompany the location of one ad-
ditional institution.
An analysis of these considerations accomplishes the following results: it
weeds out those uses which cannot initially show sufficient injury to warrant
invalidation of the ordinance; and it enables the court to determine when a
municipality can justifiably zone against a larger public interest. As such, it
is within the competency of courts to make this kind of analysis. It allows
them to focus on the uniqueness of the detriment alleged by the community
without requiring a comprehensive knowledge of available land resources or
involving the exercise of planning expertise.
neighbors. In the context of charitable immunity to tort liability, one commentator has
pointed out that
Resource allocation applies equally well to charitable institutions as to profit
making enterprises. A charity sells itself just as any other service does. What it
accomplishes in good works is its production. Its success depends on the desirability
of those works, in the eyes of donors and others who pay for the charity's services, in
comparison with the costs the works entail. A rational choice among charities, and
between charities and other services requires that all the costs be before the public ....
[T]here is no more reason for injured parties to pay the subsidy in the case of
charities than there would be in other similarly situated industries.
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YAIZ LJ. 499,
548-49 (1961). The author concedes that because of considerations of administrative
feasibility, the principles of enterprise liability may be applicable only in theory and not in
practice to non-tort situations. Id. at 532-33.
74. This situation actually occurred when Wiltwyck sought to locate in Dobbs Ferry
where another institution for the rehabilitation of delinquents is situated. That institution
joined with the town in opposing Wiltwyck's entry. Conversation with Harry G. Liese,
attorney for Wiltwyck, December 13, 1961.
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Had these considerations been articulated in the Wiltwyck case, the argu-
ments presented by Yorktown to sustain the zoning ordinance would not have
appeared so persuasive. First, as contrasted with the exclusively psychiatric
approach of child guidance clinics, Wiltwyck's physical plant and suburban
surroundings are an integral part of its guidance program.75 This "environ-
mental therapy" 76 approach has received wide commendation. 77 It would
follow from this and from Wiltwyck's obvious need to locate near
New York City 78 that an exceptionally strong showing of "general en-
vironmental need" can be made. Second, Wiltwyck, as a non-profit institu-
tion which obtained legal title to land prior to the passage of the zoning
amendment, 70 can demonstrate specific need to locate in Yorktown. To deny
Wiltwyck the right to use its property for the sole purpose for which it was
purchased-namely, for carrying out its service function-should be deemed
confiscatory by the court. And finally, the detriment which Yorktown fears
will attend the presence of Wiltwyck should not be considered a sufficient
ground for exclusion. Such detriment-possible injury to persons and
property should any of the boys stray from Wiltwyck and potential decline in
property values s--would invariably accompany Wiltwyck's presence wher-
ever it locates. It is therefore customary detriment and unless Yorktown can
demonstrate unusual detriment, namely that Wiltwyck's presence in York-
town will work significantly greater harm than would occur in any other
suitable community, the amendment excluding Wiltvyck should be invali-
dated.
75. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
76. Petitioner-Appellant's Brief, p. 8.
77. Air. Hugh Pomeroy, a zoning expert who was a witness for Yorktown said of
Wiltwyck:
[I]t is an institution characterized by nobility of purpose, by competence of operation
and by excellence of accomplishment, and we regard its work as having deep humani-
tarian motivations and of substantial importance.
Record, p. 258. See also McCoRD & McCoRD, PSYCHOPATHY AND DFLINQUENCY (1956);
McCord & McCord, Two Approaches to the Cure of Delinquents, 44 J. Cram. L., C. & P.S.
442 (1953) (analysis of the Wiltwyck program).
78. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
79. See note 17 supra and accompanying text. This fact amongst others distinguishes the
WViltwyck case from Matter of Jewish Mental Health Soc'y v. Village of Hastings, 268 N.Y.
458, 198 N.E. 30 (1935), affirming 243 App. Div. 707, 277 N.Y. Supp. 989, appeal dismissed,
297 U.S. 696 (1935), on which the court and Yorktown relied heavily. In the Hastings case,
the ordinance making consent of the local board of health a prerequisite to the erection of any
hospital, had been enacted prior to the purchase of the property. For an extended treatment
of the features distinguishing the Wiltwyck and Hastings cases, see Judge Kleinfeld's
dissent, 14 App. Div. 2d 198,219 N.Y.S.2d 161,189 (1961).
80. Record, pp. 169-71, 176-77, 183-84, 247-54.
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